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a grant of such authority to a military court, in lieu thereof, will be
23
termed an encroachment on the federal court's jurisdiction.
The present status of the law seems to be that ex-servicemen canuot
be tried by the military or civil courts for crimes committed while on
24
active duty overseas, unless charges are brought prior to discharge.
In respect to civilian dependents and civilians working for and with the
armed forces, the military courts continue to exercise jurisdiction. It
also seems reasonable that the Supreme Court will extend the Toth
ruling to exempt civilians subject to the U. C. M. J., who return to the
preferred by the military authorities
United States before charges are
25
for crimes committed overseas.
J. N. GoLDING
Taxation-Federal Income-Nonrestricted Stock Options-Proprietary and Compensatory Options-Taxability of Options upon Receipt'
In a recent Supreme Court decision, a serious blow was dealt taxpayers seeking to avoid income taxation arising out of certain employeremployee stock option plans. In Commissioner v. LoBue2 the Court
decided against a distinction supported in the Tax Court s and Courts of
Appeals 4 which, for income tax purposes, divided employee stock option
plans into two types.
The basic problem involved may be illustrated simply. TP, a key
employee of X Corporation, is given an option by the corporation to
21 It is likely that Congress will now give the federal courts jurisdiction over
ex-servicemen and ex-dependents; such would be constitutional. U. S. CONST.
art. III, § 2; Skiriotes v. Fldrida, 313 U. S. 69 (1941) ; United States v. Bowman,
260 U. S. 94 (1923) ; Jones i. United States, 137 U. S. 202 (1890).
2 Military jurisdiction is not retroactive in regard to crimes committed prior
to induction, although servicemen are presently on active duty; United States
v. Logan, C. M. 248867, 31 B. R. 363 (1944) ; nor can it be revived as to crimes
committed during the first enlistment, even though a second enlistment immediately follows; United States ex rel Herschberg v. Cooke, 336 U. S. 210 (1949).
However, military jurisdiction does not cease while a discharged serviceman is
serving his sentence; Kohn v. Anderson, 255 U. S. 1 (1921) ; and if charges are
brought before discharge, military jurisdiction continues after said discharge;
Carter v. McCloughry, 183 U. S. 365 (1902).
2u 351 U. S. 487, 490.

'In 1950 Congress enacted what is now INT. Rnv. CODE OF 1954, § 421, which
provides for capital gains treatment of certain "restricted stock options." If an
option complies with § 421 the employee has to report no income until he sells the
stock; and, then, any excess over the option price is taxed as a capital gain.
However, any stock option plan which does not come within the restrictions of
§ 421 will not receive the special capital gains treatment. The taxability of these
so-called nqnrestricted options is the subject of this note.
2 351 U. S. 243 (1956).

' Malcolm S. Clark, P-H 1950 T. C. Mem. Dec. f1 50210; Norman G. Nicholson, 13 T. C. 690 (1949) ; Delbert B. Geeseman, 38 B. T. A. 258 (1938).
'Commissioner v. LoBue, 223 F. 2d 367 (3d Cir. 1955), re'd, 351 U. S. 243
(1956) ; Commissioner v. Smith, 142 F. 2d 818 (9th Cir. 1944), rev'd, 324 U. S. 177
(1945).
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buy a number of its shares of stock. On the date the option is given
the option price may be about the same as the fair market value of the
stock.5 Later when TP exercises the option the fair market value of
the stock has risen and TP purchases at a considerable saving. TP's
preference is to report no income upon receipt or exercise of the option
and, upon subsequent sale or exchange of the stock, to report any profit
as capital gains.
As early as 19236 the Commissioner urged that the spread or difference between the option price for the stock and the fair market value
of the stock is taxable income to the employee exercising the option.
The Board of Tax Appeals originally supported the Commissioner's
contention. 7 Some Courts of Appeals, however, did not agree. 8
The Board decided in 1938 that there were two types of employee
stock option plans. 9 According to the Board's theory, one type of option
is compensatory in nature and in fact intended as compensation to the
employee.' 0 The second type is proprietary in nature and intended
only to give the employee a bargain purchase of the stock so that he
might acquire an ownership interest in the corporation."' Only where
the option is compensation to the employee would he be taxed on the
spread between the option price and the fair market value of the stock.
The Commissioner acquiesced 12 in this reasoning until 1945 when the
Supreme Court in Commissioner v. Smith13 gave him new hope that
his original determination had been valid. In this decision the Supreme
Court reinstated a finding of the Tax Court that an option was compensatory because of the intent of the parties, ignoring the proprietary
option theory on which the Court of Appeals had reversed.
Following the Smith case the Commissioner ruled in T. D. 5507 :4
The relationship of the option price to the market value of the stock on the
date the option is granted has been and will continue to be an important factor in
employee stock option cases. Rossheim v. Commissioner, 92 F. 2d 247 (3d Cir.
1937) ; Omaha Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 75 F. 2d 434 (8th Cir. 1935); Wanda
V. Van Dusen, 8 T. C. 388 (1947), aft'd, 166 F. 2d 647 (9th Cir. 1948); Albert
R. Erskine, 26 B. T. A. 147 (1932).
'T. D. 3435, 11-1 Cum. BULL. 50 (1923).
'Albert R. Erskine, 26 B. T. A. 147 (1932).
8 Omaha Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 75 F. 2d 434 (8th Cir. 1935), reversing
29 B. T. A. 817 (1934) ; Rossheim v. Commissioner, 92 F. 2d 247 (3d Cir. 1937),
reversing 31 B. T. A. 857 (1934).
'Delbert B. Geeseman, 38 B. T. A. 253 (1938).
" Van Dusen v. Commissioner, 166 F. 2d 647 (9th Cir. 1938); Connelly's
Estate v. Commissioner, 135 F. 2d 64 (6th Cir. 1943); Edward J. Epsen, 44
B. T.
A. 322 (1941).
"1 Malcolm S. Clark, P-H 1950 T. C. Mem. Dec. 1 50210; Norman G. Nicholson, 13 T. C. 690 (1949); James M. Lamond, P-H 1946 T. C. Mem. Dec. 1 46023.
1 1939-1 Cum. BULL. 13. The Commissioner also amended the regulations to
conform with the Board's holding. The difference between the option price and
the market price was to be taxable to the employee "to the extent that such
difference is in the nature of (1) compensation for services rendered or to be
rendered ... ." T. D. 4879, 1939-1 Cum. BULL. 159.
1- 324 U. S. 177 (1945).
1 1946-1 Cum. BULL. 18.
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"If property is transferred by an employer to an employee
for an amount less than its fair market value, regardless of
whether the transfer is in the form of a sale or exchange, the
difference between the amount paid for the property and the
amount of its fair market value is in the nature of compensation
and shall be included in the gross income of the employee."
On the same day a statement amplifying and interpreting T. D. 5507
was issued:
"If an employee receives an option . . . to purchase stock
of the employer corporation, . . . and the employee exercises such
option, the employee realizes taxable income by way of compensation on the date upon which he receives the stock to the extent
of the difference between the fair market value of the stock when
it is received and the price paid therefor."' 5
The Commissioner thus, in effect, revived his 1923 ruling; again, all
options were taxable to the employee on the spread between the option
price and market value of the stock when the stock is received.1' The
Commissioner's determinations, however, did not end the idea of pro7
prietary stock options.'
In Commissioner v. LoBue the stock option had been awarded
LoBue in recognition of his "contribution and efforts in making the
operation of the company successful."' 8 The Tax Court and Court of
Appeals had both held that the option was proprietary.19 In holding
that the distinction between proprietary and compensatory stock options
does not exist for income taxation purposes and that both should be
taxed alike, the Supreme Court said:
"... [T]here is not a word in section 22(a) which indicates
that its broad coverage should be narrowed because of an employer's intention to enlist more efficient service from his employees by making them part proprietors of his business. In our
view there is no statutory basis for the test established by the
courts below. . . . Section 22(a) taxes income derived from
compensation 'in whatever form paid.' And in another stock
--I. T. 3795, 1946-1 Cum. Bum. 15, 16.

"0Usually the stock will be received at the same time the option is exercised.
However, when the stock is received at a date later than the exercise the Supreme
Court has held the spread to be taxable at the later time. Commissioner v. Smith,
324 U. S. 695, denying rehearing of 324 U. S.177 (1945).
aff'd 223 F. 2d 367 (3d Cir. 1955),
1 Phillip J. LoBue, 22 T. C. 440 (1954),
rev'd 351 U. S. 243 (1956) ; Robert A. Bowen, P-H 1954 T. C. Mem. Dec. g 54206,
asCommissioner v. LoBue, 351 U. S.243, 244 (1956).
x'Philip J.LoBue, 22 T. C. 440 (1954), aff'd 223 F. 2d 367 (3d Cir. 1955),
ree'd 351 U. S.243 (1956).
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option case we said that section 22(a) 'is broad enough to include
in taxable income any economic or financial benefit conferred
on the employee as compensation, whatever the form or mode by
which it is effected.' "20
Thus the Court in LoBue has abolished a complicated tax doctrine
of eighteen years' standing 2' by taking a more realistic view than had
the Courts below of the actual economic benefits derived by employees
22
receiving options. Now that the Court has ruled that all nonrestricted
stock options are compensatory, the question remains as to when and at
what valuation the gain should be reported.
TREATING THE RECEIPT OF THE OPTION ITSELF AS COMPENSATION

That the option itself may be the only intended compensation has
been recognized, at least in dicta, by the Supreme Court. In Commissioner v. Smith the option involved had no value when received by
the taxpayer. However, the Court stated: ". . . It of course does not
follow that in other circumstances not here present the option itself,
rather than the proceeds of its exercise, could not be found to be the
only intended compensation. '23 The Court had in the opinion previously
given an indication of what kind of option it might consider as compensation to the employee:
". .. When the option price is less than the market price
of the property for the purchase of which the option is given, it
may have present value and may be found to be itself compensation for services rendered ....

The option could operate to com-

pensate the taxpayer only as it might be the means of securing
the transfer of the shares of stock from the employer to the employee at a price less than their market value, or possibly, which
we do not decide, as the option might be sold when that disparity
in value existed .. "24
If an employee successfully contends that his option is compensation when received his tax saving might be substantial. He would
2 Commissioner v. LoBue, 351 U. S. 243, 247 (1956).
The "another stock option case" was Commissioner v. Smith, 324 U. S. 177, 181 (1945). Note that the
Court based its decision on INT. REv. CODE OF 1939, § 22(a), 52 STAT. 457 and
not T. D. 5507 or I. T. 3795. Section 22(a) defined gross income as including
"gains, profits, and income derived from . . . compensation for personal service
...of whatever kind and in whatever form paid."
"For further discussion of the problems involved in determining whether
an option is compensatory or proprietary, see Dillavou, Employee Stock Options,
20 ACCOUNTING REV. 320 (1945); Comment, 56 YALE L. J. 706 (1947); Note,
11 TAX L. REv. 179 (1956).
2 See note 1 supra.
22 Commissioner v. Smith, 324 U. S. 177, 182 (1945).
2
'Id. at 181.
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report as ordinary income the value of the option the year received.
option or stock would be
Any subsequent gain realized on sale of the
25
rates.
gains
capital
lower
the
under
taxed
Aside from the dictum of the Supreme Court in the Smith case, the
taxpayer may find support from two recent Courts of Appeals cases.
In McNamara v. Commissioner26 the option was assignable and was
not conditioned on McNamara's continued employment with the corporation. A present value was indicated by the spread between option
price and market value when the option was granted.2 7 McNanara's
uncontroverted evidence showed the intent 28 of the employer was that
the option itself would be compensation to him in 1945, the year of its
grant. For that year the corporation claimed a salary deduction in an
amount representing the value it placed on the option, and McNamara
reported the same amount as ordinary income.29 The Commissioner,
however, disallowed the employer's deduction and ruled that the transaction gave McNamara no income.
When McNamara exercised the option in subsequent years, the
Commissioner assessed deficiencies, stating that the spread between
option price and fair market value on the date the option was exercised and stock paid for was taxable income.30 The Tax Court decided
in favor of the Commissioner. 31
In reversing the Tax Court, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
felt that the facts of the case established a situation such as the Supreme
Court had described in the dictum of Commissioner v. Smith.3 2 The
This is the risk
2 Of course, the market price of the stock may decrease.
that the employee takes in reporting the value of the option as ordinary income.
However, presumably the amount so reported would be reflected in the basis of the
and, upon subsequent exercise, the basis of the stock.
option
2'210 F. 2d 505 (7th Cir. 1954).
"The option granted a right to purchase a total of 12,500 shares during a two
year period. The option price was $16 per share. On the date the option was
granted the fair market value of the stock was $19 per share. The taxpayer and
valued the option at $16,375.
the corporation
"8A board of directors resolution had stated that the option was "in addition"
to the taxpayer's cash salary. In the yearly report to the Securities Exchange
Commission, the corporation reported that the option was granted to the taxpayer
for "services rendered or to be rendered."
29 If the taxpayer does not report the value of the option as income in the year
received, he may be estopped or deemed to have waived the right to claim the
amount as income in that year. See Bothwell v. Commissioner, 77 F. 2d 35 (10th
Cir. 1935).
"0The difference between the option price and the market price of the stock
when the option was exercised was $78,125 in 1946 and $77,343.75 in 1947.
21 Harley V. McNamara, 19 T. C. 1001 (1953), re7Id 210 F. 2d 505 (7th Cir.
1954). The Tax Court said that the intended compensation was the profit to be
derived upon exercise of the option and not the option itself. "This is not a
case of the distribution of a stock option or warrant, which has a clearly ascertainable market value or which the employee could readily sell. Although there
was no provision in the option forbidding assignment, it is nevertheless plain that
by either party." Id. at 1010.
no assignment or sale was ever contemplated
32324 U. S. at 181-82. The finding of the Tax Court that the compensation
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facts upon which the court relied were: (a) The taxpayer and the
employer intended the option as compensation when granted; (b) the
taxpayer and the employer both reported a valuation on the option itself
in 1945; (c) the option had value when granted; (d) the option was
assignable.
In Commissionerv. Stone's Estate33 the taxpayer, Stone, was allowed
to purchase one hundred warrants at a price of $10 per warrant. Each
warrant entitled him to buy one hundred shares of the employer's stock
at a certain price. On the date Stone obtained the warrants, the market
price of the stock was below the warrant price. However, he reported
$5000 compensation for that year as the total additional value of the
one hundred warrants. 34 In the next year Stone sold eighty-nine of the
warrants for $82,680, returning the rest to the corporation at the purchase price.
Stone sought to pay capital gain rates on the profit he realized from
the sale. The Commissioner determined that the gain was ordinary
income, falling within the scope of T. D. 5507 and I. T. 3795. He relied specifically on a part of I. T. 3795:36
"If an employee transfers such option for consideration in an
arm's length transaction, the employee realizes taxable income by
way of compensation on the date he receives such consideration
to the extent of the value of such consideration."
The Court of Appeals affirmed the Tax Court holding in favor of
the taxpayer, 36 both courts relying on the dictum in the Smith case.
The Court reasoned that the warrants had value when obtained by the
taxpayer. This was illustrated by the following facts: (a) Stone bought
the warrants and reported the amount by which his estimate of their
value exceeded the purchase price as income; (b) the warrants were
intended by the parties was not the value of the option itself but the spread between
fair market value of the stock on the day of exercise and the option price was
held "clearly erroneous" by the Circuit Court because not supported by substantial
evidence. "It seems clear to us, from the language of the parties found in the
written instruments they executed and from their actions, that they intended the
option itself to be the additional compensation by the parties for petitioner's
services." McNamara v. Commissioner, 210 F. 2d 505, 510 (7th Cir. 1954).
"210 F. 2d 33 (3d Cir. 1954).
,The taxpayer's burden of proof on the value of the warrants was sustained
by two expert witnesses. The Tax Court said it was convinced from the evidence
that the 100 warrants were worth $6000 to Stone when he received them. However, exactly what data this valuation was based upon does not appear.
"11946-1 Cum. BULL. at 16.
"Estate of Lauson Stone, 19 T. C. 872 (1953), aff'd 210 F. 2d 33 (3d Cir.
1954). The Tax Court reasoned that the warrants involved differed from the
usual options given to employees. On this ground it is difficult to reconcile this
decision with the Tax Court's decision in the McNamara case. However, in
McNamara the Tax Court had held that the option itself had no ascertainable
value; here, the warrants were held to have such a value. Accepting the court's
findings of fact the opposite holdings by the Tax Court are reconcilable.
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fully assignable by Stone; (c) the holder of the warrants was protected
from dilution of his right to purchase stock.
The Supreme Court in Commissioner v. LoBue left the road open
for further taxpayer arguments that the receipt of the option is compensation.
"It is of course possible for the recipient of a stock option to
realize an immediate taxable gain .... The option might have a
readily ascertainable market value and the recipient might be free
to sell his option .... ,,3
In future option cases the obstacle which employees will have to
overcome will be the proving of a "present value" of the option when
received, apparently required by the dictum in Commissioner v. Smith. 8
The Court's dictum can be interpreted to mean that in order to have
present value the option price should be less than the market price of
the stock. In the LoBue case the Court referred to a "readily ascertainable market value" and the right to sell the option. It cited the McNamara case as an idea of what it had in mind. 39 It may well be that
the Supreme Court intended to imply that proof of the existence of both
factors is essential for invocation of the McNamara rule.
As a summary, the following factors indicate a possibility that an
option will be taxed when received: (1) The option has value on the
date granted. Value means a present value and will usually be related
to the spread between the option price and the fair market value of the
stock. (2) The option is freely assignable by the employee. 40 (3) Circumstances surrounding the granting of the option indicate that the
parties intend the option as compensation. (4) The employee includes
the value of the option when granted in his tax return for that year.
Problems of valuation will not be too great for the employees of
larger corporations whose stock is readily available on the exchanges.
However, where a small corporation is involved, the value of the option
when received will usually be a matter of some conjecture. In some
tax matters the courts have been quite reluctant to evaluate property
where its value is a matter of much uncertainty. 41 The Supreme Court
" Commissioner v. LoBue, 351 U. S. 243, 249 (1956).
311324 U. S. at 181.
"' The Court made no reference to Commissioner v. Stone's Estate, 210 F. 2d
33 (3d Cir. 1954).
"'Where the option was not assignable it has been held not to be compensation to the employee at date of grant. Dean Babbitt, 23 T. C. No. 108 (Feb. 14,
1955) ; John C. Wahl, 19 T. C. 651 (1953). In John C. Wahl one half of the
option could not be obtained unless taxpayer was still employed by the corporation. Taxpayer could not assign the option except to other employees. Such restrictions were held to make determination of a value impossible.
41 In Burnet v. Logan, 283 U. S. 404 (1931),
the Commiisioner attempted to
apportion amounts received and to be received by the taxpayer for sale of stock

